Roman Expansion in Ancient France & Germania

Julius Caesar invoked the threat of Germanic attacks as one justification for his annexation of Gaul ( modern France ) to Rome.

As Rome expanded to the Rhine and Danube rivers, it incorporated many Celtic societies into the Empire.

The Germanic tribal homelands to the north and east emerged collectively in the records as Germania. The peoples of the Germania were sometimes at war with Rome, but also engaged in complex and long-term Alps relations, military alliances, and cultural exchanges with Rome as well.

The initial purpose of the Roman campaigns was to protect Trans-Alpine Gaul by controlling the area between the Rhine and the Elbe.

In 58 B.C. Julius Caesar, governor of the Roman province of Southern Gaul, conquered the remainder of Gaul, which had been free until then: Thus, for the first time, the powerful Roman Empire moved into immediate vicinity to Germania, and further expansion and colonization on part of the Germanic tribes were blocked.

Caesar defeated Germanic warlord Ariovist, who had tried to conquer Gaul himself, and pushed back the Germanic Tencterians, who had crossed the Rhine from Upper Hesse. He had a 400-meter bridge built over the Rhine in 10 days, marched to the Germanic right bank of the Rhine, showed off the power of his army, won over the Germanic Ubians as allies and forced some other tribes into peace agreements.

In 38 B.C. Augustus' general Agrippa resettled the Germanic Ubians, allied with Rome, in a new town at the left bank of the Rhine in order to protect Roman Gaul from raids by uncontrolled Germania. This was the founding of Colonia Agrippinensis, today's City of Cologne.

The wealthy country of Gaul seemed firmly and safely in the hands of the Romans. Even before the Roman conquest, the Gauls had already lived in towns, and they started to get used to living under Roman rule. But in 16 B.C. Gaul was raided by the Germanic Sugambrians, Usipians, and Tencterians. They severely defeated Roman governor Lollius and freely looted the wealthy country and then returned to their homeland with heavy booty.

Emperor Augustus had led many wars, but this was the heaviest defeat his forces had suffered so far. Though Gaul was only looted, these attacks made Rome afraid that one day it could lose Gaul, a country that by then was yielding more taxes and crop than the fabulously wealthy Egypt.

In order to avoid this danger in the long run, Germania had to be conquered - though the country itself neither offered cities, nor treasures, nor a food surplus.

Augustus moved to the Rhine border and prepared the big offensive in person. First, all the territory between the Alps and the Danube was to be conquered, and then Germania was to be attacked simultaneously from the Rhine, the Danube, and from the North Sea coast with a fleet.

As a starting point, the Romans established 50 legion camps along the Rhine and connected them by army routes (these camps turned into modern cities Xanten, Bonn and Mainz).

Along the left bank of the Rhine, a considerable Roman fleet was being built. Emperor Augustus appointed his adoptive son Drusus governor of Gaul and made him commander-in-chief of the Rhine troops - probably 5 to 6 legions, or about 50,000 men, expected to conquer Germania.

While the Romans were preparing the war against Germania from their province of Gaul, the Gauls were embittered over the Roman tax collection: Apparently several Gaullic tribes were ready to risk an uprising against the Roman rule. But Drusus fell with his horse, broke his thigh, and died of wound-fever after one month, being only 29 years old.
He had been successful, and popular with Romans, and favoured by the Emperor: It is likely he would have become Augustus' successor - instead of his uncanny brother Tiberius.

After the death of the victorious general Drusus, 33 years-old Tiberius assumed continuation of the war. In the spring of 8 B.C., he once again crossed the Rhine with a large army.

The Germanic tribes were too weakened from the continuous warfare of the last years to put up any resistance: For four years, they had been attacked every year by superior Roman armies, their settlements had been regularly burnt down, and their fields devastated. In the countless bloody battles and skirmishes during these four years, probably all tribes had lost a significant proportion of their men.

Already in the previous year, the allied tribes had been unable to prevent Drusus' army from marching through their territories. This year promised to be equally unsuccessful. It seemed better to capitulate now - and not to wait until one would be totally defeated and defenseless. Probably out of these considerations, all Germanic tribes sent envoys to the Romans, asking for peace.

In an unpopular manner that was typical to Emperor Augustus, he simply arrested all the men, and had them brought to several Roman cities as hostages and they evaded this imprisonment by resorting to suicide. Now the Romans succeeded peace treaties with most of the Germanic tribes. They accepted Roman rule, and started to pay tribute and provide troops for the Romans.

German Memory - US President Gen Dwight D Eisenhower in the German POW Crisis

Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the 34th President of the United States (1953-1961) who was in charge of the Allied Forces during the Second World War, made the controversial decision to reclassify German prisoners of war (POWs) in U.S. custody as Disarmed Enemy Forces (DEFs). As DEFs, they could be compelled to serve as unpaid conscript labor. An unknown number may have died in custody as a consequence of malnutrition, exposure to the elements, and lack of medical care.

Canadian author James Bacque in his book "Other Losses" heavily criticized Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower for his involvement in treating the German prisoners of war. James Bacque's comments in "Other Losses" were widely discussed on American and German televisions and received a mixture of excitement and anger.

The reason for the reaction was the author's conclusion that Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, as head of the American occupation in Germany in 1945, deliberately starved to death German prisoners of war in staggering numbers. Bacque holds that "the victims undoubtedly number over 800,000, almost certainly over 800,000 and quite likely over a million. Their deaths were knowingly caused by army officers who had sufficient resources to keep them alive."

Eisenhower's method, according to Bacque, was simple: he changed the designation of the prisoners from "Prisoners of War" (P.O.W.), which required by the Geneva Convention to be fed the same rations as US Army's, to "Disarmed Enemy Forces" (D.E.F.), which allowed him to cut their rations to starvation level.

Bacque says the D.E.F. were also denied medical supplies and shelter; because of that they died by hundreds of thousands. Their deaths were covered up on Army records by listing them as "other losses" on charts showing weekly totals of prisoners on hand, numbers discharged and so forth.

Bacque was quoted in a wire service interview as saying, "Americans should take down every statue of Eisenhower, and every photograph of him and annul his memory from American history as best they can, except to say, 'Here was a man who did very evil things that we're ashamed of."

But the critics exclaimed if there were a million dead, where were the bodies? Did Eisenhower have such vast power that he could order starvation on a mass scale and keep it a secret? Was the undoubted suffering in the camps, especially the transit camps along the Rhine, the result of Eisenhower's policy or the result of the chaotic conditions that prevailed in Europe in the spring and summer of 1945?

Historian Stephen Ambrose criticised James Bacque for having had no previous historical research or writing experience. James Bacque himself admitted in his introduction to the book "Other Losses": "Doubtless many scholars will find faults in this book, which are only mine. I welcome their criticism and their further research, which may help to restore to us the truth after a long night of lies."

Some time back, the Eisenhower Center at the University of New Orleans invited some leading experts to examine the charges. The conference participants, including historian Stephen Ambrose came to the first conclusion that James Bacque had made a major historical discovery: "There was widespread mistreatment of German prisoners in the spring and summer of 1945. Men were beaten, denied water, forced to live in open camps without shelter, given inadequate food rations and inadequate medical care. Their mail was withheld. In some cases prisoners made a "soup" of water and grass in order to deal with their hunger. Men did die needlessly and inexcusably."

Their second conclusion was, "when scholars do the necessary research, they will find Bacque's work to be worse than worthless. It is seriously - nay, spectacularly - flawed in its most fundamental aspects". They accused that, "he misuses documents; he misreads documents; he ignores contrary evidence; his statistical methodology is hopelessly compromised; he makes no attempt to look at comparative contexts; he puts words into the mouth of his principal source; he ignores a readily available and absolutely critical source that decisively deals with his central accusation; and, as a consequence of these and other shortcomings, he reaches conclusions and makes charges that are demonstrably absurd."

The final conclusion of historians was that Eisenhower was an enthusiastic supporter of denazification, but not because he hated the Germans or believed in collective guilt. On the contrary, he believed that there were Germans who were committed to democracy and that the task of the occupation was to find them and bring them to the fore.

In a speech in Frankfurt in 1945, he declared, "The success or failure of this occupation will be judged by the character of the Germans 50 years from now. Proof will come when they begin to run a democracy of their own and we are going to give the Germans a chance to do that, in time."

Historians exclaimed, "This does not sound like a man who simultaneously was directing the death by starving a million of young Germans."

German Memory - US President Gen Dwight D Eisenhower in the Crisis of Starving German POWs

Canadian author James Bacque in his book "Other Losses" heavily criticized Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower for his involvement in treating the German prisoners of war. James Bacque's comments in "Other Losses" were widely discussed on American and German televisions and received a mixture of excitement and anger.

Historians criticized Bacque, "He completely misunderstands Eisenhower's position and activity in the occupation. He puts full responsibility on Eisenhower for every policy decision, never recognizing that he had superiors from whom he took policy directives and orders - specifically, the Army Chief of Staff, the European Advisory Commission, acting in the name and with the authority of the British, Soviet and American Governments."

The report at the New Orleans conference with the diplomatic background, by Brian Villa of the University of Ottawa, noted that the policy of Eisenhower's superiors was to impress upon the Germans the fact of their defeat, the fact that they had brought it on themselves and in other ways to "treat 'em rough." Denazification was one aspect of that policy. Another was that German prisoners would not be fed at a higher level than German civilians, than the civilians of the liberated nations, or than the displaced persons (DPs).

An assertion that was central to Bacque's accusation was his contention that there was no European food shortage in 1945. He pointed to warehouses in Germany full of food. He stated that the Red Cross had enough food available. One of his pieces of evidence was that a train from Geneva loaded with food parcels sent by the Red Cross to feed German prisoners was forced to turn back.

But historians denied Bacque's accusation and came out with the revelation that the Allied Governments had decided those Red Cross food parcels were to feed displaced persons, of whom there were more than two million in Germany.

They also pointed out the fact denying Bacque's accusation of no food shortage that Eisenhower wrote to the Chief of Staff, Gen. George C. Marshall, in February 1945: "I am very much concerned about the food situation... We now have no reserves on the Continent of supplies for the civil population."

Eisenhower wrote to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on April 25, 1945: "Unless immediate steps are taken to develop to the fullest extent possible the food resources in order to provide the minimum wants of the German population, widespread starvation and disease are inevitable during the coming winter."

Historians pointed out Eisenhower had sent many messages before the surrender of Germany on the expectation of possible inadequacy of food. After the first week of May, all of Eisenhower's calculations as to how many people he would be required to feed in occupied Germany became woefully inadequate. He had badly underestimated, for two reasons. First, the number of German soldiers surrendering to the Western Allies far exceeded what was expected (more than five million, instead of the anticipated three million) because of the onrush of German soldiers across the Elbe River to escape the Russians. So too the German civilians - there were millions fleeing from east to west, about 13 million altogether, and they became Eisenhower's responsibility.

Eisenhower faced shortages even before he learned that there were 17 million more people to feed in Germany than he had expected.

The report of the Military Governor for Germany in July 1945 stated, "The food situation throughout Western Germany is perhaps the most serious problem of the occupation. The average food consumption in the Western Zones is now about one-third below the generally accepted subsistence level."

The September report declared, "Food from indigenous sources was not available to meet the present authorized ration level for the normal consumer of 1,550 calories per day."

Historians criticized Bacque's accusation that the prisoners were receiving 1,550 calories a day and his observation that such a ration meant slow starvation. They pointed out he apparently never looked at what civilians were getting in Germany or in the liberated countries. In Paris in 1945, the calorie level was 1,550 for civilians. It was only slightly higher in Britain, where rationing continued. It was much lower in Russia, where rationing also continued. As noted, the official ration for German civilians was 1,550, but often not met. In Vienna in the summer of 1945 the official ration sometimes fell to 500. Historians noted anyone who was in Europe in the summer of 1945 would be flabbergasted to hear that there was no food shortage.