When my discussion with Pascal turned into the unification of the German Nation and its emergence of the new European super power, how Otto von Bismarck played diplomacy and statesmanship surprised us.
Bismarck took advantage of his great skills in the field of diplomacy and led two wars which turned Prussia into the most powerful state among other states of the German Confederation and a major power in Europe. He ultimately made the German Nation an European super power by the unification of various states in to a single entity.
At the very early stage in his career, he opposed the unification of Germany, arguing that Prussia would lose its independence in the process. He accepted his appointment as one of Prussia's representatives at the Erfurt Parliament, an assembly of German states that met to discuss plans for union, but only in order to oppose that body's proposals more effectively. The Parliament, in any event, failed to bring about unification, for it lacked the support of the two most important German states, Prussia and Austria.
In 1852, Friedrich Wilhelm appointed Bismarck as Prussia's envoy to the Diet of the German Confederation in Frankfurt. His eight years in Frankfurt were marked by changes in his political opinions. No longer under the influence of his ultraconservative Prussian friends, Bismarck became less reactionary and more moderate. He became convinced that Prussia would have to ally itself with other German states in order to countervail Austria's growing influence. Thus, he grew more accepting of the notion of a united German nation.
Shortly after he served as the Prussian envoy in Frankfurt he had undertaken an ambassadorial position to Russia. While Bismarck was promoted, Helmuth von Moltke and Albrecht von Roon were appointed as the new Chief of Staff for the Prussian army and the Prussian Minister of War respectively and these three men over the next 12 years transformed the German Nation by unifying it into a powerful nation of Europe.
Before unification, the German Nation consisted of a multitude of principalities loosely bound together as members of the German Confederation. The Germanic Confederation of 39 states which was created from the previous 300 was under the heavy influence of Austria and its emperor as the president of the Confederation. Only portions of the territory of Austria and Prussia were included in the Confederation.
Showing posts with label Frankfurt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Frankfurt. Show all posts
Sunday, December 23, 2007
German Memory - US President Gen Dwight D Eisenhower in the German POW Crisis
Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the 34th President of the United States (1953-1961) who was in charge of the Allied Forces during the Second World War, made the controversial decision to reclassify German prisoners of war (POWs) in U.S. custody as Disarmed Enemy Forces (DEFs). As DEFs, they could be compelled to serve as unpaid conscript labor. An unknown number may have died in custody as a consequence of malnutrition, exposure to the elements, and lack of medical care.
Canadian author James Bacque in his book "Other Losses" heavily criticized Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower for his involvement in treating the German prisoners of war. James Bacque's comments in "Other Losses" were widely discussed on American and German televisions and received a mixture of excitement and anger.
The reason for the reaction was the author's conclusion that Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, as head of the American occupation in Germany in 1945, deliberately starved to death German prisoners of war in staggering numbers. Bacque holds that "the victims undoubtedly number over 800,000, almost certainly over 800,000 and quite likely over a million. Their deaths were knowingly caused by army officers who had sufficient resources to keep them alive."
Eisenhower's method, according to Bacque, was simple: he changed the designation of the prisoners from "Prisoners of War" (P.O.W.), which required by the Geneva Convention to be fed the same rations as US Army's, to "Disarmed Enemy Forces" (D.E.F.), which allowed him to cut their rations to starvation level.
Bacque says the D.E.F. were also denied medical supplies and shelter; because of that they died by hundreds of thousands. Their deaths were covered up on Army records by listing them as "other losses" on charts showing weekly totals of prisoners on hand, numbers discharged and so forth.
Bacque was quoted in a wire service interview as saying, "Americans should take down every statue of Eisenhower, and every photograph of him and annul his memory from American history as best they can, except to say, 'Here was a man who did very evil things that we're ashamed of."
But the critics exclaimed if there were a million dead, where were the bodies? Did Eisenhower have such vast power that he could order starvation on a mass scale and keep it a secret? Was the undoubted suffering in the camps, especially the transit camps along the Rhine, the result of Eisenhower's policy or the result of the chaotic conditions that prevailed in Europe in the spring and summer of 1945?
Historian Stephen Ambrose criticised James Bacque for having had no previous historical research or writing experience. James Bacque himself admitted in his introduction to the book "Other Losses": "Doubtless many scholars will find faults in this book, which are only mine. I welcome their criticism and their further research, which may help to restore to us the truth after a long night of lies."
Some time back, the Eisenhower Center at the University of New Orleans invited some leading experts to examine the charges. The conference participants, including historian Stephen Ambrose came to the first conclusion that James Bacque had made a major historical discovery: "There was widespread mistreatment of German prisoners in the spring and summer of 1945. Men were beaten, denied water, forced to live in open camps without shelter, given inadequate food rations and inadequate medical care. Their mail was withheld. In some cases prisoners made a "soup" of water and grass in order to deal with their hunger. Men did die needlessly and inexcusably."
Their second conclusion was, "when scholars do the necessary research, they will find Bacque's work to be worse than worthless. It is seriously - nay, spectacularly - flawed in its most fundamental aspects". They accused that, "he misuses documents; he misreads documents; he ignores contrary evidence; his statistical methodology is hopelessly compromised; he makes no attempt to look at comparative contexts; he puts words into the mouth of his principal source; he ignores a readily available and absolutely critical source that decisively deals with his central accusation; and, as a consequence of these and other shortcomings, he reaches conclusions and makes charges that are demonstrably absurd."
The final conclusion of historians was that Eisenhower was an enthusiastic supporter of denazification, but not because he hated the Germans or believed in collective guilt. On the contrary, he believed that there were Germans who were committed to democracy and that the task of the occupation was to find them and bring them to the fore.
In a speech in Frankfurt in 1945, he declared, "The success or failure of this occupation will be judged by the character of the Germans 50 years from now. Proof will come when they begin to run a democracy of their own and we are going to give the Germans a chance to do that, in time."
Historians exclaimed, "This does not sound like a man who simultaneously was directing the death by starving a million of young Germans."
Canadian author James Bacque in his book "Other Losses" heavily criticized Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower for his involvement in treating the German prisoners of war. James Bacque's comments in "Other Losses" were widely discussed on American and German televisions and received a mixture of excitement and anger.
The reason for the reaction was the author's conclusion that Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, as head of the American occupation in Germany in 1945, deliberately starved to death German prisoners of war in staggering numbers. Bacque holds that "the victims undoubtedly number over 800,000, almost certainly over 800,000 and quite likely over a million. Their deaths were knowingly caused by army officers who had sufficient resources to keep them alive."
Eisenhower's method, according to Bacque, was simple: he changed the designation of the prisoners from "Prisoners of War" (P.O.W.), which required by the Geneva Convention to be fed the same rations as US Army's, to "Disarmed Enemy Forces" (D.E.F.), which allowed him to cut their rations to starvation level.
Bacque says the D.E.F. were also denied medical supplies and shelter; because of that they died by hundreds of thousands. Their deaths were covered up on Army records by listing them as "other losses" on charts showing weekly totals of prisoners on hand, numbers discharged and so forth.
Bacque was quoted in a wire service interview as saying, "Americans should take down every statue of Eisenhower, and every photograph of him and annul his memory from American history as best they can, except to say, 'Here was a man who did very evil things that we're ashamed of."
But the critics exclaimed if there were a million dead, where were the bodies? Did Eisenhower have such vast power that he could order starvation on a mass scale and keep it a secret? Was the undoubted suffering in the camps, especially the transit camps along the Rhine, the result of Eisenhower's policy or the result of the chaotic conditions that prevailed in Europe in the spring and summer of 1945?
Historian Stephen Ambrose criticised James Bacque for having had no previous historical research or writing experience. James Bacque himself admitted in his introduction to the book "Other Losses": "Doubtless many scholars will find faults in this book, which are only mine. I welcome their criticism and their further research, which may help to restore to us the truth after a long night of lies."
Some time back, the Eisenhower Center at the University of New Orleans invited some leading experts to examine the charges. The conference participants, including historian Stephen Ambrose came to the first conclusion that James Bacque had made a major historical discovery: "There was widespread mistreatment of German prisoners in the spring and summer of 1945. Men were beaten, denied water, forced to live in open camps without shelter, given inadequate food rations and inadequate medical care. Their mail was withheld. In some cases prisoners made a "soup" of water and grass in order to deal with their hunger. Men did die needlessly and inexcusably."
Their second conclusion was, "when scholars do the necessary research, they will find Bacque's work to be worse than worthless. It is seriously - nay, spectacularly - flawed in its most fundamental aspects". They accused that, "he misuses documents; he misreads documents; he ignores contrary evidence; his statistical methodology is hopelessly compromised; he makes no attempt to look at comparative contexts; he puts words into the mouth of his principal source; he ignores a readily available and absolutely critical source that decisively deals with his central accusation; and, as a consequence of these and other shortcomings, he reaches conclusions and makes charges that are demonstrably absurd."
The final conclusion of historians was that Eisenhower was an enthusiastic supporter of denazification, but not because he hated the Germans or believed in collective guilt. On the contrary, he believed that there were Germans who were committed to democracy and that the task of the occupation was to find them and bring them to the fore.
In a speech in Frankfurt in 1945, he declared, "The success or failure of this occupation will be judged by the character of the Germans 50 years from now. Proof will come when they begin to run a democracy of their own and we are going to give the Germans a chance to do that, in time."
Historians exclaimed, "This does not sound like a man who simultaneously was directing the death by starving a million of young Germans."
Saturday, December 22, 2007
German Memories - Crisis With Denmark and Austria - Otto Von Bismarck's Diplomacy
Bismarck faced a diplomatic crisis in November 1863 over the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein; they were claimed by Denmark and by Frederick von Augustenburg, a German duke. Prussian public opinion strongly favoured Augustenburg's claim; however, Bismarck took an unpopular step by insisting that the territories legally belonged to the Danish monarch under the London Protocols signed a decade earlier. Nonetheless, Bismarck did denounce Danish decision to annex the duchy of Schleswig to Denmark.
With support from Austria, he issued an ultimatum for Denmark to return Schleswig to its former status; when the Danes refused, Austria and Prussia invaded, commencing the Second War of Schleswig.
As a result of the German victory, Denmark was forced to cede both duchies. Originally, it was proposed that the Diet of the German Confederation where all the states of Germany were represented should determine the fate of these duchies; however, before this scheme could be effected, Bismarck induced Austria to agree to the Gastein Convention. Under this agreement, Prussia received Schleswig, while Holstein went to the Austrians.
In 1866, Austria reneged on its prior agreement with Prussia by demanding that the Diet of the German Confederation determine the Schleswig-Holstein issue. Bismarck used Austria's demand as an excuse; charging that the Austrians had violated the Convention of Gastein and sent the Prussian troops to occupy Holstein. Provoked, Austria called for the aid of other German states, who quickly became involved in the Austro-Prussian War.
With the aid of Albrecht von Roon's army reorganization, the Prussian army was nearly the equal in numbers to the Austrian army. With the organizational genius of Helmuth von Moltke, the Prussian army defeated Austria and its allies, concluding the conflict with a crushing victory at the Battle of Koniggratz. The silent rivalry between Austria and Prussia finally ended up with the Battle on July 3, 1866, with casualties of more than 30,000 soldiers dead and wounded on both sides.
As a result of the Peace of Prague, the German Confederation was dissolved; Prussia annexed Schleswig, Holstein, Frankfurt, Hanover, Hesse-Kassel, and Nassau; and Austria promised not to intervene in German affairs. Austria was excluded, and remained outside of German affairs for most of the remaining 19th and 20th centuries.
Bismarck played a crucial role in uniting most of the German states into a single unit in the absence of Austrian influence.
In his first speech Bismarck referred to the issue of German unification by his famous remark: "the great questions of the day will not be decided by speeches and the resolutions of majorities - that was the great mistake from 1848 to 1849 - but by blood and iron." He was referring to the failed Frankfurt Parliament as the great mistakes of 1848 and 1849. Bismarck used both diplomacy and the Prussian military in order to achieve German unification.
To solidify Prussian hegemony, Prussia and several other North German states joined the North German Confederation in 1867; King Wilhelm I served as its President, and Bismarck as its Chancellor.
With support from Austria, he issued an ultimatum for Denmark to return Schleswig to its former status; when the Danes refused, Austria and Prussia invaded, commencing the Second War of Schleswig.
As a result of the German victory, Denmark was forced to cede both duchies. Originally, it was proposed that the Diet of the German Confederation where all the states of Germany were represented should determine the fate of these duchies; however, before this scheme could be effected, Bismarck induced Austria to agree to the Gastein Convention. Under this agreement, Prussia received Schleswig, while Holstein went to the Austrians.
In 1866, Austria reneged on its prior agreement with Prussia by demanding that the Diet of the German Confederation determine the Schleswig-Holstein issue. Bismarck used Austria's demand as an excuse; charging that the Austrians had violated the Convention of Gastein and sent the Prussian troops to occupy Holstein. Provoked, Austria called for the aid of other German states, who quickly became involved in the Austro-Prussian War.
With the aid of Albrecht von Roon's army reorganization, the Prussian army was nearly the equal in numbers to the Austrian army. With the organizational genius of Helmuth von Moltke, the Prussian army defeated Austria and its allies, concluding the conflict with a crushing victory at the Battle of Koniggratz. The silent rivalry between Austria and Prussia finally ended up with the Battle on July 3, 1866, with casualties of more than 30,000 soldiers dead and wounded on both sides.
As a result of the Peace of Prague, the German Confederation was dissolved; Prussia annexed Schleswig, Holstein, Frankfurt, Hanover, Hesse-Kassel, and Nassau; and Austria promised not to intervene in German affairs. Austria was excluded, and remained outside of German affairs for most of the remaining 19th and 20th centuries.
Bismarck played a crucial role in uniting most of the German states into a single unit in the absence of Austrian influence.
In his first speech Bismarck referred to the issue of German unification by his famous remark: "the great questions of the day will not be decided by speeches and the resolutions of majorities - that was the great mistake from 1848 to 1849 - but by blood and iron." He was referring to the failed Frankfurt Parliament as the great mistakes of 1848 and 1849. Bismarck used both diplomacy and the Prussian military in order to achieve German unification.
To solidify Prussian hegemony, Prussia and several other North German states joined the North German Confederation in 1867; King Wilhelm I served as its President, and Bismarck as its Chancellor.
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German university students donate a boat and engine to an affected fisherman.
Germans university students with Dietmar Doering (centre) at Marawila beach.
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